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Abstract
Is privacy a luxury for the rich world? Remarkably, there
is a dearth of literature evaluating whether data privacy is
too costly for companies to implement, or too expensive
for governments to enforce. This paper is the first to offer a
review of surveys of costs of compliance, and to summarize
national budgets for enforcement. The study shows that

while privacy may indeed prove costly for companies to
implement, it is not too costly for governments to enforce.
This study will help inform governments as they fashion and
implement privacy laws to address the “privacy enforcement
gap”—the disparity between the privacy on the books, and
the privacy on the ground.
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Introduction
Is privacy a luxury for the rich world? 1 This paper seeks to understand how much data privacy
laws cost to implement and enforce. Relying on industry surveys, government studies, and government
agency budgets, this paper compares the costs of private sector implementation and public sector
enforcement for the United States, European Union, and, to a limited extent, China. We conclude that
data privacy is not outside the reach of the poorer parts of the world, though the rules should be written
with differing resources for compliance and enforcement.
The focus of this project is to help provide the informational base needed to support the
practical realization of data privacy protections. Like some other legal domains, data privacy laws are
subject to an “enforcement gap”—“that is, a wide disparity between the stated protections on the
books and the reality of how companies respond to them on the ground.” 2 A decade ago, Kenneth
Bamberger and Deidre Mulligan observed that “no one has conducted a sustained inquiry into how
corporations actually manage privacy and what motivates them.” 3 Their study helped understand how
companies were responding to regulations and enforcement. But even a decade later, we know too
little about the costs of compliance or the costs of enforcement. Despite the rapid embrace of laws
designed to regulate the use of personally identifiable information, there is a remarkable scarcity of
studies of their costs. 4 The absence of data makes it difficult to assess possible regulatory measures in
the area. Some in developing nations may be worried about the costs for small and medium-sized
companies of compliance with new regulations. Governments too may also be concerned about the
additional costs of enforcement of new laws.
This study begins to fill that lacuna by describing the costs of compliance with data privacy
laws for businesses and the costs of enforcement for governments. By focusing on costs, the study
should not be read in any way to neglect benefits. A wide array of scholarship and experience has
shown that privacy regulations have widespread benefits. 5 Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union all declare privacy a fundamental human right. 6 Benefits of data privacy are

Julia Angwin, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4 2014.
Filippo Lancieri, Narrowing Data Protection’s Enforcement Gap (unpublished manuscript, dated Jan. 2021) (on
file with author).
3 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV.
247, 249 (2011).
4 We discuss the existing studies in Part II below. This paper relies on a number of different sources. The
principal sources are the laws and regulations of the United States, the European Union, and China, scholarly
and professional studies of the operation of the privacy regimes of these three jurisdictions, and government
reporting on budgets in these jurisdictions. We supplemented these sources with both expert interviews and a
survey that we designed and circulated.
5 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408 (2008) (“The core of intellectual privacy is
the freedom of thought and belief.”); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013)
(arguing that, among other things, privacy is “foundational to the practice of informed and reflective
citizenship”); Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 442 (2016) (reviewing economic literature on privacy).
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, art. 8, U.N.Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc.
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union: 2010 O.J. (C83) 389. Proclaimed by the Commission, 7 December 2000.
1
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difficult to quantify outside clear invasions like identity theft. 7 Not only does data privacy have
enormous benefits for individuals, it helps companies build and maintain the trust of both their users
and their business partners. Indeed, understanding the costs of compliance and enforcement will better
enable developing countries to design their laws and enforcement structures.
Understanding the costs of compliance and enforcement is critical to both designing laws and
to enforcing them. Across the world, nations are establishing data privacy rules. 8 The datafication of
the economy means that few companies or individuals are untouched. Laws regulating the use of
personally identifiable data are a necessary foundation of the digital economy. Companies are collecting
data at an unprecedented rate, as computers mediate more and more of our lives. Laws help prevent
abuse and thus help build trust as individuals interact in an increasingly digitized world. Data privacy
is a necessity not just in richer nations, but in poorer ones as well.
Achieving data privacy presents special challenges in the developing world—both for
companies and governments. Micro, small and medium-sized companies may lack the resources to
ensure compliance with complicated laws. If compliance is too expensive, businesses will simply ignore
the law or avoid the jurisdiction altogether. Governments, their resources already stretched, may not
be able to devote sufficient resources for privacy enforcement.
Data privacy is also increasingly critical to international trade. As data travels across the world,
governments and individuals seek to ensure that privacy protections travel alongside. At the same time,
data regulations can be used to disfavor foreign service providers; data regulations that mandate data
localization impose special costs. 9
We focus here on three specific data privacy regimes, the European Union, the United States,
and China. Because of their large economies, these data privacy regimes have global influence. The
study seeks to elaborate and quantify the costs of data regulations, recognizing the limitations of the
data available. Because the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and
various U.S. laws have been in place already, we can illuminate the experience of companies in
complying with those laws. We also describe the costs of enforcement.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I begins by briefly characterizing three of the major data
protection regimes--the United States, the European Union, and China. Part II then describes the costs
of private sector compliance with respect to each of these three regimes. Part III turns to the costs of
public enforcement, again for these three different jurisdictions. Part IV concludes by drawing some
lessons, focusing on developing countries.
I.

Three Approaches to Data Privacy: EU, US, and China

We focus on three principal jurisdictions in this study, the European Union, the United States,
and China. The rules in each of these jurisdictions have evolved significantly in recent years and
continue to evolve so any account of their costs inevitably describes a moving target. In order to better
7 While certain harms of data abuse are more readily calculable—such as those for identity theft—the harm
from many data violations can be hard to assess. Thus, the full benefits of data protection are difficult to quantify.
When describing the impact of a change to HIPAA rules in 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services
noted, “We are not able to quantify the benefits of the rule due to lack of data and the impossibility of monetizing
the value of individuals’ privacy and dignity….” Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement,
and Breach Notification Rules, 78 FED. REG. 5566, 5567 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 &
164). 78 FED. REG. 5567.
8
UNCTAD Cyberlaw
Tracker, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4DLegislation/eCom-Data-Protection-Laws.aspx.
9 Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L. J. 677 (2015).
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understand the price of compliance and the costs of enforcement, we first summarize the major
features of each regime below, drawing out some of the key approaches to compliance in these
jurisdictions.
A.
Compliance under the EU Data Privacy Regime
The GDPR requires that every entity processing personal data must have a legal basis to do
so, such as consent or because it is necessary for the performance of a contract. 10 If that basis is
consent, that consent must be “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.” 11 Personal data
must be processed lawfully, fairly, and transparently; collected for specified and legitimate purposes;
adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are
processed; accurate; kept no longer than necessary for such purposes; and processed in a manner that
ensures appropriate security. 12 It gives data subjects the rights to be informed, to access and rectify
data, to be forgotten, to restrict processing, to data portability, and to object to certain processing of
their data. The GDPR mandates that data controllers and processors institute privacy by design,
seeking to implement data-protection principles in their products, taking into account both costs of
implementation and risks for data subjects. 13 For data processing activities posing high risks to data
subjects, the GDPR requires data controllers to carry out data protection impact assessments. 14 In
addition, data controllers and processors may have to designate data protection officers when, for
example, carrying out large-scale processing of special categories of data. 15 The GDPR goes beyond
data privacy by, for example, giving each person the right to object to automated decision-making that
produces legal effects on that person.
Because the GDPR adopts a risk-based approach, an organization’s compliance obligations
and related expenditures vary considerably depending on the risks posed by an organization’s data
collection or processing activities. 16 Data collection or processing that presents considerable risks to
the rights and freedoms of data subjects by virtue of the nature, scope, context, and purpose of
processing are high risk under the GDPR. Examples might include processing based on new
technologies, and extensive automated decision-making with legal effects. As described above, such
processing requires the implementation of procedures such as mandatory data protection impact
assessments in which risks in processing are identified and safeguards presented, informing controllers
of measures to be taken to mitigate and risk and, in certain cases, prior consultation with a Data
Protection Authority before proceeding. 17 Furthermore, organizations are required to take the
appropriate technical and organizational measures to properly safeguard personal data pursuant to the
regulation’s policy of data protection by design and default. 18

10 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 27, 2016 on the Protection
of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 (EU)
[hereinafter GDPR].
11 Id. art. 4(11).
12 Id. art. 5.
13 Id. art. 25.
14 Id. art. 35.
15 Id. art. 37.
16 European Commission, The GDPR: New Opportunities, New Obligations (2018).
17 GDPR News, What Is High Risk Under GDPR? Compliance Junction, (2017); GDPR, art. 35-36.
18 Council Directive 2016/679, art. 28, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2.
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B.
Compliance under the US Data Privacy Regime
The United States data privacy regime lacks a comprehensive law that regulates the collection
and processing of personal data of U.S. residents by private parties. While there are constraints against
government information collection through both the Federal Constitution and an extensive statutory
framework regulating government use of personal data, there is no similar broad federal regulatory
privacy law regulating private parties. Instead, the current data privacy framework arises out of a
patchwork of federal and state laws, many of which are focused on a particular sector of the economy.
By focusing the law on particular areas of concern, the United States has effectively chosen business
freedom as a key principle in the area. Outside specified areas, the focus is limited to enforcing the
privacy promises that businesses make to users, rather than on specific mandates setting out what
businesses can and cannot do with data. Sectoral laws include the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), covering the health industry, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),
covering the financial sector. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) gives the Federal
Trade Commission broad authority to regulate data practices if they constitute “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 19 Through the FTCA, the Federal Trade Commission
serves as the nation’s de facto privacy regulator, and its settlements create a kind of common law of
privacy. 20
HIPAA imposes an extensive set of privacy protections for personal health data gathered by
covered entities, including hospitals, health care providers, and health insurers. Not only must health
plans and health care providers give patients a written notice of their privacy practices, they must also
“maintain reasonable and appropriate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to ensure the
integrity and confidentiality of the information, and to protect against any reasonably anticipated
threats.”21 These safeguards include designating a privacy official, training employees, and developing
a system of sanctions for employees who violate the entity’s policies. 22 HIPAA also mandates the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to “adopt security standards that take into
account the technical capabilities of record systems used to maintain health information, the costs of
security measures, and the value of audit trails in computerized record.” 23 There is extensive rulemaking elaborating the statute.
The GLBA (also known as the Financial Modernization Act) regulates the use of nonpublic
personal information by institutions or businesses engaged in financial activities such as banks, insurers,
and brokerage firms. The GLBA empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce the
“obligations that establish standards for financial institutions relating to administrative, technical, and
physical information safeguards.” 24 Covered entities are obligated to protect any “personal information
collected about an individual in connection with providing a financial product or service, unless that
information is otherwise publicly available.” 25
California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which went into effect at the beginning of 2020,
will have significant impact, especially on larger enterprises. The nation’s first comprehensive privacy
law regulating commercial enterprise, the CCPA has a broad reach outside of California, covering all
companies that do business in California and either (1) have an annual gross global revenue in excess
of $25 million, (2) handle the personal information of at least 50,000 California residents, or (3) derive
Fed. Trade Comm’n Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2006)
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
583 (2013).
21 C. Stephen Redhead, RS20500, Medical Records Privacy: Questions and Answers on the HIPAA Rule 6 (Cong.
Research Serv. 2004).
22 Id.
23 Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. IV, §§ 261-264, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
24 Pub. L. No. 106-102, tit. V, Subtitle A, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
25 Id.
19
20
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half or more of their revenue from selling consumers’ personal information. Because many businesses
in the United States (and elsewhere) meet this threshold, the CCPA effectively governs most
multinational corporations (wherever they are based) that serve the United States. 26 The CCPA
requires businesses to disclose the types and sources of personal data the business collects from
customers, while granting California residents the right to access and delete personal information. The
CCPA thus relies on a notice and consent model. The CCPA is principally enforced by California’s
Attorney General. These rights include the right to be notified about what personal information is
collected and to opt out of the sale of that information.
C.
Compliance under the Chinese Data Privacy Regime
China’s data privacy regime is the newest of the three jurisdictions described here. It is best
understood against the backdrop of China’s development as a leading technological power that has
simultaneously sought to maintain strong government control and public order. China’s approach
reflects a now nearly decade-old “national strategy to embrace ‘big data.’” 27 With its data protection
laws, China has embraced three goals simultaneously—to protect citizens’ lawful interests, to protect
networked information security, and to protect national security and public order. 28 A fourth goal, the
promotion of China’s technological advancement, has also been a key consideration in its
implementation of data protection laws.
State security has been a focus of Chinese data policy from the start. The Golden Shield—
nicknamed “the Great Firewall of China”—sought to ensure that the internet would not be used to
disseminate information that might threaten public order and might even be used to create “an
ennobling space where netizens complete their transformation into perfect citizens.” 29 Typically, data
protection policies are focused on the protection of the data of individuals and not at the promotion
of state interests. However, data protection policies by their nature expand regulatory control over the
activities of private companies and individuals, paving the way for China to operate its web and flow
of data under the model of a cyber-sovereignty. 30 By focusing on state security, China prefers to
implement regulations such as data localization laws to keep all its information within its borders, which
enhances its ability to monitor and regulate information. 31
In 2016, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued Administrative Rules on
Information Services via Mobile Internet Applications (the App Rules), seeking to directly regulate
China’s burgeoning app industry. These rules require app providers to obtain any necessary licenses or
qualifications required of information services, make clear the nature and scope of data collection and
use, and obtain consent from users before using location, address book, and camera features. App
providers are also required to register the real names of their users, alongside information content
See Anupam Chander, Margot Kaminski, & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, MINN. L. REV
(forthcoming 2021).
27 Jinting Deng, Should the Common Law System Welcome Artificial Intelligence: A Case Study of China's SameType Case Reference System, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 223, 229 (2019). As Lu Chuanying, a scholar with the
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, describes, China has become a “leading data power (数据大国) on
a global scale.” Graham Webster & Rogier Creemers，A Chinese Scholar Outlines Stakes for New 'Personal Information'
and 'Data Security' Laws, New America (May 28, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurityinitiative/digichina/blog/chinese-scholar-outlines-stakes-new-personal-information-and-data-security-lawstranslation/.
28 Emmanuel Pernot-Leplay, China's Approach on Data Privacy Law: A Third Way Between the U.S. and the E.U.?,
8 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 49, 69 (2020).
29 Lorand Laskai, Nailing Jello to a Wall, in CONTROL 191 (ed. Jane Golley et al.).
30 Id. at 197.
31 Pernot-Leplay, supra note 28, at 104.
26
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review. 32 The Cybersecurity Law also imposes real name registration obligations for information
publishing and instant messaging services. 33 Being able to identify the user can be useful for the
government in identifying lawbreakers, though human rights advocates have raised concerns about
such requirements.
The cornerstone of China’s data protection law can be found in the Cybersecurity Law enacted
in 2017 by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. That law imposes numerous
data protection obligations on “network operators,” which are defined broadly to include “network
owners, managers, and network service providers.” 34 A central obligation is the requirement to obtain
consent before collecting or sharing personal information. 35 While the laws themselves pose their
requirements in very broad language, the government has provided guidance on their interpretation.
In 2017, a technical committee supervised by the Cyberspace Administration of China and the
Standardization Administration of China issued the National Standard of Information Security
Technology – Personal Information Security Specification (“2018 Specification”), which became
effective in 2018. While non-binding, the Specification has proved highly influential, establishing what
have been described as a set of best practices related to data protection. 36 The government relies on
this standard for enforcement actions. 37 The 2018 Specification often goes beyond the statutory text.
For example, while the Cybersecurity Law requires only that companies “not gather personal
information unrelated to the services they provide,” the Specification goes further to limit collection
only to information that is necessary. 38
A revised Specification went into effect on October 1, 2020. This 2020 Specification requires
affirmative (opt in) consent for processing sensitive personal information. 39 It also requires “fully
informed” consent for the collection and use of biometric information. The 2020 Specification requires
a data protection officer for organizations that process the personal information of more than one
million people, organizations principally engaged in the processing of personal information and
employing more than 200 individuals, or organizations that process sensitive personal information of
more than 100,000 individuals. The 2020 Specification establishes new rules for companies that
Norton Rose Fulbright, China issues new rules to tighten regulation of Mobile Apps market, Norton Rose
Fulbright (July 2016), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/93003105/chinaissues-new-rules-to-tighten-regulation-of-mobile-apps-market.
33
Jones
Day,
Implementing
China’s
Cybersecurity
Law
2
(2017),
https://www.jonesday.com/files/upload/Implementing%20Chinas%20Cybersecurity%20Law.pdf.
32

Wangluo Anquan Fa（网络安全法）[Law on Cybersecurity] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., November 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), art. 76 (3).
35 Id. arts. 22, 41, & 42.
36 Covington, China Releases Draft Amendments to the Personal Information Protection Standard, Data Privacy and
https://www.cov.com/Cybersecurity
(February
11,
2019)
/media/files/corporate/publications/2019/02/china_releases_draft_amendments_to_the_personal_informati
on_protection_standard.pdf. Our interviewees confirmed that the Specifications were taken seriously, despite
not having the force of law.
37 Jenny (Jia) Sheng, Chunbin Xu, China Publishes Best Practices for Protection of Perosnal Information
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/china-publishes-best-practices-for-protection-ofpersonal-information.html.
38 Cybersecurity Law, Art. 41 (emphasis added); Pernot-Leplay, supra note 28, at 94-95.
39 Michelle Chan, Clarice Yue, Tiantian Ke, China Cybersecurity Law Update: Two New National and Industry
Standards: Personal Information Specification and Personal Financial Information Specification, Bird & Bird (April 24, 2020),
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2020/china/china-cybersecurity-law-update-two-new-nationaland-industry-standards; Hogan Lovells, The dust has finally settled – the long journey of China's new Personal Information
Security Specification (April 2020), https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/the-dust-has-finally-settled.
An
official
English
translation
of
the
2020
Specification
is
available
here:
https://www.tc260.org.cn/front/postDetail.html?id=20200918200432.
34
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personalize information based on profiling, including targeted advertising. 40 The 2020 Specification
provides detailed rules on the obligations of both personal information controllers and the third parties
with which they share information. These include responsibilities for conducting security assessments
of third parties, monitoring third parties, and disclosing to individuals that a third party will have access
to their information. 41 The 2020 Specification also requires the information controller to take
immediate action if it learns that a third party with which it has shared data has processed information
inappropriately. 42
The 2020 Specification adopts aspects of the GDPR model. The guidance, for example,
requires companies that gather large amounts of personal information to appoint a data protection
officer (though the Chinese specification is not technically binding). The guidance also imposes duties
on data controllers with respect to third parties with whom they share information.
However, distinct differences remain. One of the architects of the 2018 Specification,
Yuehong Hong, observes that these rules are “stricter than the U.S., but not as much as the EU.” 43
For example, unlike the EU, where consent must be explicit, the Chinese interpretation of consent
seems to permit implied consent, at least for non-sensitive personal information. 44 The right to port
your data from one online service provider to another, while broad under the GDPR, is limited by the
2018 Specification only to an individual’s basic information, as well as health, psychological, education
and work information. 45 Yet at certain other points, the Chinese law, at least on its face, can be even
more demanding than the EU law. For example, the Cybersecurity Law seems to make consent the
exclusive basis for information collection, unlike EU law which allows a variety of bases for collecting
personal information, including a category of “legitimate interests.” 46 A draft proposal from the
Cyberspace Administration of China would require network operators to inform “the local cyberspace
administration when they collect important data or sensitive personal information;” 47 this would
enhance the ability to regulate for security-related goals.
Security is also a key motivation for other aspects of the data regime. In comparison to the
US’s all-permissive approach to cross-border data flow and the EU’s careful control on outward flows
of personal data, China has moved towards highly restrictive policies to keep data within its own
borders. 48 On June 13, 2019, China released a draft regulation on the outbound transfers of personal
information, separating its treatment of “important data” and “personal information,” which it had
previously categorized under one umbrella. 49 With regards to the outbound transfer of personal
information, the 2019 draft permits domestic network operators to enter into contractual agreements
with foreign data receivers to allow for the transfer of personal data. 50 In order to transfer or access
personal data outside the China, data controllers must (1) inform the data subject of the overseas
transfer, (2) obtain express consent from the data subject, (3) store a copy of the data within China, (4)
conduct a security assessment and file this with the local CAC, 5) establish data transfer agreements
with overseas data receivers, 6) submit an annual report to the CAC on all related data transfers, 7)
keep a record of all cross-border data transfers for a minimum of five years and 8) to appoint an officer
Hogan Lovells, supra note 39, at 4.
Sheng & Xu, supra note 32.
42 Hogan Lovells, supra note 39, at 6.
43 Pernot-Leplay, supra note 28, at 82, n. 150 and accompanying text.
44 Id. at 84. The proposed amendments to the Standard also make provision for implied consent.
45 Id. at 101.
46 GDPR art. 6.
47 Ken Dai & Jet Deng, 2019 China Data Protection Cybersecurity Annual Report (Dentons 2020).
48 Richard D. Taylor, “Data Localization”: The Internet in Balance, 44 J. TELECOMM. POL’Y at 8 (2020).
49 The Diplomat, China’s New Data Protection Scheme (July 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/chinasnew-data-protection-scheme/.
50 Taylor at 8.
40
41
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to take care of compliance matters with CAC data security requirements. 51 While this technically allows
cross-border data flows, the hurdles can be so high that many may find them to complex or expensive
to manage. 52 The 2020 Draft Data Security Law addresses “important data,” which must be kept
strictly local. “Important data” relates to China’s national, economic and public security as well as social
stability. 53 The 2020 draft seeks to establish a system to monitor and warn of security data leaks, an
emergency response system to handle security leak accidents, and a national security review system to
investigate activities that may pose security threats. 54 Other guidelines such as the 2020 Personal
Financial Information Protection Technical Specification issued by the People’s Bank of China also
govern the cross-border transfer of financial information and more specialized forms of data. 55 Neither
the 2019 Personal Information Outbound Transfer Security Assessment Draft nor the 2020 Draft Data
Security Law nor the 2020 Personal Financial Information Protection Technical Specification is yet
binding law. While the 2017 Cybersecurity Law is binding, its laws are vaguely drafted and flexible in
terms of interpretation. 56 Even though companies are not bound by law to comply with these
guidelines, they are strongly encouraged to implement them to their best ability and treat these
guidelines as the direction that the Chinese government intends to move. 57
On July 2, 2020, the National People’s Congress of China published a draft version of the new
Data Security Law. 58 The draft law would clearly establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over companies
outside China whose data usage harms Chinese national security. The draft also would establish that
certain data with national security implications would be subject to export controls.
Practitioners suggested that a key cost of compliance was in setting up privacy management
systems, including data mapping. One significant challenge was to change the internal culture to
prioritize privacy.
II.

Costs of Private Compliance

The cost for complying with privacy law varies dramatically—from the baker managing a
relatively small database of her regular customers’ orders to the 1,000-person company supplying
information services to a variety of clients across multiple jurisdictions. In this Part, we summarize a
variety of studies on the costs of compliance with respect to data privacy law in the EU and the United
States.
The different studies paint vastly different portraits of costs. One study estimates mean
expenditure for privacy compliance to be $1 million in 2018, the year the GDPR first went into effect,
and $622,000 in 2019. 59 Another study, meanwhile, found an average focused on GDPR compliance
DLA
Piper,
Data
Protection
Laws
of
the
World
Handbook
3
(2020),
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=about&c=AO at 5.
52 Cf. Anupam Chander, Is Data Localization a Solution for Schrems II?, 23 J. INT’L EC. L. 771 (2020), at
https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgaa024 (arguing that hurdles for cross-border transfer out of the European Union
post judicial rulings may be so burdensome as to effect a ”soft data localization”).
53 Yan Luo & Zhijing Yu, China Issued the Draft Data Security Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (2020),
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-security/china-issued-the-draft-data-security-law/.
54 Id.
55 Norton Rose Fulbright, PBOC Issues New Specification on Personal Financial Information (March 2020),
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/fcdc5f10/pboc-issues-new-specificationon-personal-financial-information.
56 Pernot-Leplay, supra note 29, at 49, 74.
57 Id.
58 Nick Becket, Amanda Ge & Roxie Meng, China Publishes Draft Data Security Law (CMS, 2020).
59 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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budget of $13.2 million in 2018, rising to $13.6 million in 2019. 60 Estimates for compliance with U.S.
privacy law are wide-ranging, but generally significantly lower.
The review below shows that compliance with the GDPR for large firms is quite expensive.
Our survey respondents generally ranked the EU privacy regime to be the costliest of the three
frameworks. They described the US as less expensive, whether for large or small firms, and compliance
with Chinese privacy law as the least expensive, though that may be because of lack of awareness of
the law. Among our respondents, cybersecurity costs seemed to be more significant with respect to
Chinese and U.S. law compliance, than with EU law compliance. EU compliance costs seem to be
heavily skewed towards personnel, both inhouse personnel and outside consultants.
As the wide ranges might suggest, the data is inherently limited. There is no consistent
framework for analyzing the costs of compliance with data privacy laws. Every study seems to adopt
its own methodology. One study, for example, breaks down costs as consisting of 1) the costs of
granting access to data gathered on each consumer, 2) the costs of providing notice of privacy policies,
3) the costs of obtaining individual consent, 4) the costs of creating greater transparency, and 5) the
costs of granting customers choice, including that of opting out or opting in to the database. 61 Another
study meanwhile identifies the following components of data privacy costs: data protection and
enforcement activities, incident response plans, compliance audits and assessments, policy
development, communications & training, staff certification, redress activities, investments in
specialized technologies to protect data assets such as threat intelligence, managed file transfer, identity
and access governance, cyber analytics, data loss prevention, and encryption. 62 The studies are based
on surveys of selected participants, which of course reflect who is invited to take them and who actually
completes them.
Furthermore, any study of costs is necessarily incomplete. Privacy law also affects firms in
ways that are difficult to quantify. If a firm decides not to offer a feature or decides not to enter a
jurisdiction because of privacy law, the opportunity foregone is difficult to value. Little information is
available on the costs of restructuring of operations by businesses to bring them into compliance.
We conducted a survey among privacy experts to seek to obtain information about the costs
of compliance for private enterprises. 63 The survey was circulated to members of the International
Association of Privacy Professionals, and was also circulated by leading privacy expert Daniel Solove
to his LinkedIn network. We also emailed the survey to privacy lawyers we identified via web searches
and through LinkedIn. The survey was open for responses from June 18 to August 3, 2020. The survey
was posted to the web via Qualtrics and was available only to those that had the link. Various biases
introduced by a web-based survey both suggest caution in relying on its results, and we do not rely on
the survey results for our conclusions in this paper.
The questionnaire asked privacy professionals to indicate whether they worked at companies
that largely collect data on those companies’ own behalf, or companies that help other organizations
manage their data. It tailored most of the remaining questions based on the answer to that initial query.
The questions focused on the costs of complying with the privacy regimes of the three jurisdictions
that are the focus of this study, the impact of those regimes on decisions by companies, and questions
about cross-border data flows. To help provide consistency of responses, privacy professionals helping
See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
Christopher J. Robertson & Ravi Sarathy, Strategic and Ethical Considerations in Managing Digital Privacy, 46
J. Bus. Ethics. 111, 120 (2003).
62 Ponemon Institute, The True Cost of Compliance with Data Protection Regulations 5 (Dec. 2017),
https://dynamic.globalscape.com/files/Whitepaper-The-True-Cost-of-Compliance-with-Data-ProtectionRegulations.pdf.
63
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other organizations manage data were requested to respond on behalf of two hypothetical clients: a
small e-commerce firm with 100,000 user accounts and few overseas accounts; and a large business
service provider with 100 million user accounts and operations in various jurisdictions. We received 51
responses to our survey from persons based in 17 different countries. The top countries among our
respondents were the United States (43 percent), India (11 percent), Germany and UK (both 7 percent).
Half of the respondents were consultants that help other organizations manage their data, while 36
percent were data controllers themselves. The bulk of the respondents (81%) had no foreign
ownership, while 13 percent of the respondents had less than 50 percent foreign ownership and 6.38
percent of them had 50 percent or more foreign ownership. The percentage of respondents having
more than 500 full-time employees was 41 percent, 17.39 percent of respondents have more than 50
fewer than 500 full-time employees, 19.57 percent of respondents have more than 10 and fewer than
50 full-time employees, and for 21.74 percent respondents, the number of full-time employees is
between 1 and 10. Both the survey and the survey results are available online.
We also conducted interviews with a dozen leading experts across the world, in the United
States, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. We promised confidentiality with respect to their
identities so that they could advise us freely. We do not rely upon either our survey results or interviews
as dispositive. The survey results and interviews have informed our study, but largely to serve as a
check on our conclusions.
We highlight one especially costly component of data privacy because it is not limited to any
one jurisdiction. Data breaches are expensive to respond to and highlight the need for proper
cybersecurity to avoid such breaches. A global study conducted by the Ponemon Institute on behalf of
computer hardware developer IBM analyzed breaches involving the loss or theft of customer or
consumer records during July 2018 to April 2019. 64 Expenditures on activities and resources enabling
the company to successfully detect the severity and reach of a breach had an average cost of $1.22
million. 65 An average of $0.21 million was expended on resources enabling organizations to notify
regulators such as the GDPR’s Supervisory Authorities, and affected data subjects of the relevant
breach. 66 A Ponemon Institute survey found data breaches to be widespread among the companies
surveyed: “About half of the respondents had GDPR data breaches that must be reported to
regulators.” 67 This was consistent across the world: “39% of US respondents, 45% of European
respondents, 36% of Chinese respondents and 33% of Japanese respondents say they reported a
personal data breach to a regulator.” 68
A.

Compliance Costs for EU Data Protection Law
1. Overall Costs of GDPR Compliance

As indicated earlier, estimates for average annual compliance costs for the GDPR range widely,
depending on the size of the company, the nature of its business, and other factors. For large firms,
the estimates are routinely in the millions of dollars each year. A study conducted in 2019 by the
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) in conjunction with Ernst & Young, a global
professional service network, found mean privacy expenditures for the companies at which its survey
respondents worked to be $1 million in 2018, the year the GDPR first went into effect, and $622,000
IBM Security, Cost of a Data Breach (Ponemon Inst. (2019).
Id.
66 Id.
67 Ponemon Institute, Keeping Pace in the GDPR Race: A Global View of GDPR Progress in the United States,
Europe, China and Japan 2 (2019).
68 Id.
64
65
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in 2019. That study is not restricted to companies complying with the GDPR alone, but surveys
companies across the world, including many in the United States. Research conducted by the Ponemon
Institute in 2019 on behalf of international law firm McDermott Will & Emery (MW&E) focused on
GDPR compliance found substantially higher figures: an average 2019 budget of $13.6 million for
GDPR activities, a slight increase from $13.2 million in 2018. 69 The different results suggest the great
variation in expenditures for compliance, depending on firm size, industry, types of activities,
geography, perceived risks of operations, and risk tolerance. For the very large companies that make
up the FTSE 100 stock index, estimates for GDPR compliance for 2018 range from an average of $84
million for banks, $26 million for technology and telecommunications firms, to $6 million for industrial
goods and services firms. 70
A high percentage of the costs (between a fifth and a half, depending on the study) are
associated with hiring of privacy compliance personnel. Technology also accounts for a significant
portion (between 12 to 17 percent, depending on study) of GDPR privacy expenses. Outside
consultants and lawyers accounted for another 19 to 24 percent, again depending on the study. One
study concluded that GDPR compliance required extensive person-hours in meetings; DataGrail
estimates that the average company spent 2,100 hours in GDPR preparation meetings and that
enterprises staffed with 1,000 or more employees could have spent over 9,000 hours in such meetings. 71
Notably, despite these expenditures, most respondents (62% in the IAPP/EY study) believed
their privacy budget was insufficient to meet their data protection obligations. 72
The IAPP/EY study surveyed 370 respondents predominately composed of organizations
headquartered in the U.S. (39%), European Union (33%), and United Kingdom (13%). Company size
ranged from under 100 to over 75,000 employees and industry sectors represented included tech,
finance, health care, government, and consulting services. 73 The salaries and benefits of an
organization’s privacy team constituted the majority of privacy spending, on average receiving
$397,100, combined technology expenditures followed behind receiving an average mean privacy
spend of $172,000. 74 Privacy expenditures are higher for organizations with more employees:
organizations with 5,000 or fewer employees were estimated to have a mean privacy expenditure of
$257,000 in 2019 whereas organizations with 75,000 or more employees had an estimated mean privacy
expenditure of $1,883,200. 75
Mean 2019 Estimated Privacy Spend Reported to IAPP by Employee Size, U.S. Dollars 76
<5K
5K-24.9K
25K-74.9K
75K
+
Employees
Employees
Employees
Employees
Privacy Team
$170,700
$581,800
$744,200
$847,100
Salaries
Privacy Team
$23,500
$47,100
$39,700
$115,600
Technologies

Id. at 27.
Joseph Johnson, GDPR Implementation Costs for FTSE100 Companies in the United Kingdom 2018 By Sector
(Statista 2018). Currency conversion from British pounds using XE.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 37.
73 Id. at viii, xi.
74 Id. at 28.
75 Id. at 30.
76 Id.
69
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Outside
Privacy Team
Technologies
Other Privacy
Budget

$38,700

$30,500

$57,500

$814,200

$24,700

$84,500

$82,000

$106,200

TOTAL
PRIVACY
SPEND

$257,700

$743,800

$923,400

$1,883,200

The Ponemon Institute surveyed 1,263 organizations in 2019 on behalf of international law
firm McDermott Will & Emery (MW&E). Respondents hailed from the U.S. (544), Europe (371),
China (102), and Japan (246). 77 Organizations represented ranged from those with fewer than 500 to
75,000 employees and predominant industries were financial services (18%), industrial (13%),
entertainment (11%) and the health sector (11%).78 The survey found an average GDPR compliance
budget of $13.6 million in fiscal year 2019.

Annual Budgets for GDPR Compliance in 2019, U.S. Dollars
4%
$26M-$50M

3%
> $50M

12%
$21M-$25M

2%
< $500K

8%
$500,001K-$1M

13%
$1M-5M
15%
$16M-$20M

22%
$11M-$15M

23%
$6M-10M

79

2. Components of GDPR Compliance

McDermott Will & Emery, Keeping Pace in the GDPR Race: A Global View of GDPR Progress in the United
States, Europe, China and Japan (Ponemon Inst. 2019).
78 Id. at 38.
79 Id. at 62.
77
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The studies shed light on the various components of the costs of compliance. Management services,
personnel, and technologies continued to receive the greatest amount of funding, experiencing little to
no changes in allocation since 2018. 80
Distribution of Privacy Budget, 2018-2019
Study
Area of Budget
Managed services
MW&E, 2019
Personnel
(McDermott Will
Technologies
& Emery)
Consultants
Business process
engineering
Outside lawyers
Training
Salary & travel
IAPP-EY, 2019
Technology
&
(International
tools
Association
of
Outside counsel
Privacy
Internal training
Professionals)
Consulting services
Professional
development
Gov. affairs
Other

2019
28%
17%
17%
11%
11%

2018
28%
18%
17%
10%
10%

9%
7%
50%
12%

9%
7%
47%
12%

10%
9%
8%
7%

15%
N/A
8%
9%

4%
2%

3%
4%

Statista attributes the large expenditure in banking to the high risk posed by their data
processing activities as a bank data breach runs the risk of handing over the financial information and
resources of data subjects, therefore requiring heavier investments in cybersecurity. 81
Total Compliance Cost for FTSE 100 in Millions of U.S. Dollars
Research Entity
Industry
Cost
of
Compliance
Banks
$93.8M
Statista, 2018
Technology & Telecoms
$28.5M

80
81

Energy & Utilities

$27.3M

Retail

$21.4M

Health care

$15.4M

Travel & Leisure

$14.2M

Financial Services

$11.3M

GDPR

Id. at 28
Johnson, supra note 61.
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Media

Ponemon Institute, 2017

$9.5M

Industrial
Goods
Services
Financial Services
Industrial

&

$7.1M
$30.9M
$29.4M

Energy & Utilities
Transportation

$24.8M
$24.3M

Technology & Software

$23.6M

Health care
Pharmaceuticals
Consumer Products

$19M
$18.2M
$17.6M

Communications

$16.7M

Public Sector

$14.5M

Retail

$11.5M

Education & Research

$9.8M

Media
$7.7M
Note: Figures have been converted from euros to U.S. dollars using XE’s currency converter.
Salaries for privacy compliance personnel form a major part of privacy-related expenditures. A
study by DataGrail surveyed 301 professionals involved in the GDPR decision-making process at
companies with 50 or more employees in 2019 and found that 67% of companies engaged at least 25
employees when preparing for the GDPR, 44% of companies had at least 50 employees. 82 Findings
from the IAPP’s survey report that privacy staffing, like total privacy spending on GDPR compliance,
reportedly leveled off in 2019, demonstrated by only 30% of organizations surveyed in 2019 expecting
an increase in privacy staff, 66% expecting no changes, and 4% expecting a decrease. 83 An average
mean of 7.1 employees work on privacy related matters full-time while a mean of 15.7 do so parttime. 84 Blended companies that engage in both business to business and business to consumer activities
report the highest numbers in staffing along with privacy professional responsibilities, IAPP attributes
the increase to the complexities such organizations face in role defining, negotiations, and contractdrafting due to their blurred role as data processors and controllers. 85
Research Entity

Staff
Expenditure

Related

IAPP-EY, 2019

Privacy team salaries and
benefits (2019)

Cost
$397,100 (avg.)

DataGrail, The Age of Privacy: The Cost of Continuous Compliance (DataGrail 2020).
J. Trevor Hughes & Angela Saverice-Rohan, Annual Privacy Governance Report (IAPP-EY 2019).
84 Id.
85 Id. at xiv.
82
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(Respondents: 370 privacy
professionals from the
IAPP database located in
U.S. and E.U.)
Paul Hastings, 2017
(Respondents: 100 FTSE
350 & 100 Fortune 500
companies)

Salary and travel (2018)
Salary and travel (2019)

47% of privacy budget
50% of privacy budget

Additional staff (U.K.)

$263,600 – $524,700

Additional staff (U.S.)

$501,000 - $1M

Note: Data figures have been converted from Euros to U.S. Dollar using XE’s currency converter and rounded.
Data from MW&E’s study reported that almost half of the organizations represented (48%)
are either in the process or expecting to hire an average of almost four additional employees to provide
ongoing assistance with the GDPR. 86 Despite the expected increase for some, 38% of organizations
in the research group believe their organization lacks the human resources to fulfill their obligations
and sustain GDPR compliance in 2019. 87

Privacy Team Responsibilities Reported to IAPP-EY, 2019
Privacy-related legal counsel (internal)

62%

Assuring proper cross-border data transfer

66%

Privacy-related vendor management

69%

Data inventory & mapping

74%

Privacy related investigations

77%

Design and implementation of privacy controls

81%

Compliance with the GDPR

83%

Incident response

85%

Performing privacy impact assessments

85%

Following legislative developments

85%

Company awareness and training

88%

Privacy polices, procedures, and governance

94%
0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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88

The GDPR permits individuals to request the data that companies hold on them, a process
that requires an inventory of the data that companies hold, and can require configuration of their
databases. According to DataGrail’s survey findings, 58% of companies had received 11 or more data
subject requests per month since the GDPR’s implementation and the survey’s closing in April 2019,
McDermott Will & Emery, supra note 68.
Id. at 25.
88 Hughes & Saverice-Rohan, supra note 74.
86
87
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and 28% received 100 or more per month. 89 A reported 58% of companies had at least 26 employees
processing a single data subject request in 2018; this is likely attributable to the multi-step process of
registering the request, verifying the requester’s identity, and locating the data on multiple systems, an
onerous task for organizations many of which log such information on spreadsheets. 90
Operational Cost of Managing Data Subject Requests 91

Number of Employees Involved in
Processsing a Single Data Subject
Request since April 2019

Volume of Data Subject Requests
Received per Month since April
2019
35%

35%

30%

30%
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0-5
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1-10

11-25

26-50

51-100 101-500 500 +

Number of Employees Involved in Processsing a Single DSR

The manual handling of data subject requests has placed a strain on some organizations due
to the time and effort involved in servicing the requests within the required one-month window. Duties
imposed by a data subject request range from locating, compiling, and providing a data subject with all
the information an organization has stored on a data subject, free of charge, commonly known as “the
right to access,” 92 to locating and deleting all the information stored on a data subject, “the right to be
forgotten.” 93 The challenges posed by data subject requests were echoed by the IAPP’s study in which
56% of the 370 organizations surveyed reported “locating unstructured personal data” as “difficult.” 94
The operational costs that data subject requests impose on an organization appear to be related
to the organization’s location, business model, size, and revenue. 95 Findings from the IAPP report
suggest that the firms most likely to receive data subject requests have one or more of the following
variables: headquarters in Europe, a blended business model in which both data controlling and
DataGrail, supra note 73.
Id. at 3, 8.
91 DataGrail, supra note 73.
92 Council Directive 2016/679, art. 23, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2.
93 Id., art. 25, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2.
94 Hughes & Saverice-Rohan, supra note 74.
95 Id.
89
90
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processing were present, an excess of 25,000 employees and/or revenue exceeding $25 billion. 96 IAPP
respondents which received higher levels of data subject requests reported experiencing less difficulty
managing requests than respondents who received fewer. 97 The IAPP attributes this relationship to the
increased investments many organizations make toward automating the process of locating a data
subject’s information when facing high quantities of requests, thereby decreasing the amount of time
and staff needed to complete the task. 98
Though an organization is only required to hire a Data Protection Officer when either (1) the
processing of personal data is a core business activity, (2) the activity involves “sensitive” information,
or (3) the processing is performed routinely on a large scale, studies suggest many organizations have
heeded the GDPR’s encouragement to appoint a Data Protection Officer even when not required. An
overwhelming 92% of MW&E’s 1,263 respondents 99 and a three-fourth of the IAPP’s 370
respondents 100 appointed Data Protection Officers despite both surveys including a wide variety of
organizations in which the criteria mandating an appointment were unmet. Most organizations have
appointed only one Data Protection Officer, though 18% of organizations have expended resources
on appointing multiple. 101 Although a Data Protection Officer’s compensation varies by region and
experience, officers were reported to have a global salary range between $71,000 and $354,000 in
2018. 102
MW&E’s 2019 study found that 46% of respondents had hired outside counsel for GDPR
compliance. 103 The survey found that 68% of organizations hired outside counsel to conduct data
protection impact assessments, a time and labor extensive procedure performed whenever a new
processing activity is proposed and required of organizations engaging in high-risk processing. 104
Contacting data protection agencies (56%), overall risk mitigation (54%), establishing a consent
mechanism for processing (49%), and response to a data subject’s “right to be forgotten” (49%)
followed behind as common reasons for enlisting outside assistance. 105 Approximately 34% of
respondents sought outside counsel for assistance with international data transfers. The invalidation of
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2020, a data transfer
mechanism utilized by 60% of IAPP respondents, will undoubtedly result in further legal expenditures
in the area in 2020. 106
Percent of Budget Allocated on Outside Counsel & Consulting Services
Research Entity
Outside Counsel
2019
2018
and/or
Consulting
Service
Ponemon Institute
Consultants
11%
10%
(2019)
Outside Lawyers
9%
9%
IAPP-EY (2019)
Outside Counsel
10%
15%
Id.
Id.
98 Id.
99 McDermott Will & Emery, supra note 68.
100 Hughes & Saverice-Rohan, supra note 74.
101 Id.
102 Oliver Smith, The GDPR Racket: Who’s Making Money From This $9BM Business Shakedown, Forbes (2018).
103 McDermott Will & Emery, supra note 68, at 23.
104 Id.
105 McDermott Will & Emery, supra note 68.
106 Hughes & Saverice-Rohan, supra note 74; See also Case C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner v.
Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems, 2020 E.C.R. I-0000.
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Consulting
Services

8%

8%

Expenditures on third parties hired to process an organization’s personal data have become
commonplace, with 90% of the IAPP’s respondents reporting that their processing was outsourced. 107
The GDPR mandates that personal data should be outsourced to third parties for processing only
when those processors provide sufficient guarantees that processing will occur in accordance with the
GDPR through a written contract. 108 Data controllers remain responsible for non-compliance by the
processors with which they share data. The IAPP reports that only 26% of respondents conducted onsite audits to ensure GDPR compliance, with several respondents observing that doing so was laborintensive and potentially cost-prohibitive. An overwhelming majority of respondents (94%) rely on the
assurances in the contract instead, with 57% of respondents supplementing the contact with
questionnaires provided to processors to verify GDPR compliance. 109
The GDPR does not outline specific technologies that organizations should use, though the
use of encryption and pseudonymization are encouraged and required whenever feasible. 110 The IAPP
found an average of $172,000 spent on technology expenditures. 111 Of the 301 privacy professionals
involved in the decision-making process of their respective organizations, 58% of those surveyed by
DataGrail purchased commercial technology solutions in pursuit of GDPR compliance and 57%
invested in developing internal technology solutions.112 Showing similar results from a surveyed pool
of 370 privacy professionals, 46% of the IAPPs respondents invested in new technologies or services
in preparation for GDPR compliance. 113
Company Spending on Consulting Services and/or Technology
in Preparation for GDPR Compliance 114
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Manual v. Automation: Methods Used by Organizations in GDPR Compliance 115
Tools used for data inventory and mapping
60% email, spreadsheets, in-person
communication (manual)
31% commercial software tool designed for
data inventory/mapping
21% Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
technology
20% GRC software customized in-house
for inventory/mapping
8% Outsource data inventory/mapping to
external consultants/law firms
4% Don’t know
Method for handling Data Subject Requests

64% Entirely manual
25% Partially automated
7% Still being designed
2% Haven’t yet addressed
1% Automated

Of the 1,263 organizations surveyed by MW&E, 31% of respondents purchased insurance
covering cyber risks. Of those insured, 43% had insurance coverage for GDPR fines and penalties. 116
Expenditures on cybersecurity insurance vary by region with 19% of Chinese respondents, 35% of
U.S. respondents, 29% of European respondents, and 31% of Japanese respondents reporting an
insurance purchase. 117 Data breach disclosure requirements continue to be a challenge for many
organizations with only 18% of MW&E’s respondents confident in their ability to notify a data
protection authority within 72 hours of becoming aware of the incident, as required by the GDPR.118
The study suggests that many organizations need further expenditures on external cybersecurity
services that would enable organizations to identify cyberattacks early on and provide data protection
authorities the necessary forensic evidence within the mandated window of time.119
The GDPR permits regulators to fine organizations up to €20 million or 4% of an
organization’s global annual turnover, whichever is higher, in cases of noncompliance with the GDPR.
For the largest companies, this could result in fines in the millions or even billions of dollars. When a
personal data breach occurs, an organization must provide notification describing, at minimum, (1) the
nature of the breach, (2) its potential consequences, and (3) the measures the organization proposes to
mitigate any harm. 120 As of November 30, 2020, there have been approximately 460 instances where
fines have been imposed on organizations under the GDPR.121
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B.

Compliance Costs for US Privacy Law

Because of the sectoral nature of U.S. privacy law, we examine studies detailing the costs of
compliance with respect to industries, particularly health and finance.
1.

HIPAA Compliance Costs

Studies over the last two decades have estimated that the health industry, as a whole, expends
billions of dollars on HIPAA compliance initiatives. In 2003, health care consulting companies
estimated the cost for compliance to total $25 billion to $43 billion in the first five years. 122 The
Department of Health and Human Services, however, estimated that industry-wide implementation
would cost $3.2 billion in HIPAA’s first year and $17.6 billion for the first ten years. 123 In 2003, the
research firm Gartner Group estimated that the health care industry would spend between $3.8 billion
and $38 billion in pursuit of HIPAA compliance from 2003 to 2008. 124 For individual health care
providers, the cost could total millions of dollars over time. In 2002, Baylor University Medical Center
budgeted $7.5 million over the course of five years to account for HIPAA implementation. Texas
Health Resources trained 22,000 workers before an April 14, 2003 deadline, and expected to spend
more than $10 million to comply with the law. 125 Peter Swire, then Chief Privacy Counsel for the
Clinton Administration, projected that HIPAA’s Privacy Rule would cost $6.25 per year for every
insured American. 126
Cost of HIPAA Compliance for Entire Industry 127
Research Entity

Affected Respondents

Estimated Cost of
Compliance

Healthcare Consulting
Companies (2003)

Health care providers
(covered entities)

$25-43 billion (first 5 years)

Department of Health and
Human Services (2002)

Health care providers
(covered entities)

$3.2 billion (first year)
$17.6 billion (first 10 years)

Gartner Group (2003) 128

Entire health care
industry

$3.8 - $38 billion (2003-2008)

In 2011, after certain HIPAA modifications, the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) conducted a study to estimate the additional cost of compliance imposed by the

Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 Admin. L.
Rev. 85, 132 (2002).
123 Id.
124 Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 Admin. L.
Rev. 85, 132 (2002).
125 Principle Logic, LLC, HIPAA Cost Considerations 24 (Oct. 11, 2003).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Rebecca Herold & Kevin Beaver, The Practical Guide to HIPAA Privacy and Security Compliance (Auerbach
Publ’n 2014).
122
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modifications. 129 DHHS surveyed “covered entities,” which include all health plans, health care
clearinghouses and health care providers. The DHHS estimated the additional costs incurred to be
between $114 million and $225.4 million in the first year of implementation and approximately $14.5
million annually thereafter. 130 These costs include: (i) costs to HIPAA covered entities to revise and
distribute updated notices of privacy practices; (ii) costs to HIPAA covered entities to comply with the
requirements of breach notification; (iii) costs to business associates to ensure their subcontracts are
complying with business associate agreement requirements; and (iv) costs to business associates to fully
comply with HIPAA’s security rule. 131
Legislation

Estimating
Entity

Affected
Respondents

Cost of Compliance
(US$/year)

Cost of
Compliance
Components

Modifications
to the HIPAA
Privacy,
Security,
Enforcement,
and Breach
Notification
Rules

Department
of Health and
Human
Services
(2013) 132

700,000 covered
entities.

$55.9 million

Notices of
Privacy Practices

19,000 covered
entities.

$14.5 million

Breach
Notification
Requirements

Total Costs

250,000–500,000
$21–42 million
business associates
of covered entities

Business
Associate
Agreements

200,000–400,000
$22.6–113 million
business associates
of covered entities

Security Rule
Compliance by
Business
Associates

$114–225.4 million (first year)
$14.5 million (annually after)

The following tables break down the estimated costs expended by covered entities and the business
associates of covered entities in order to comply with the modified provisions of HIPAA, according
to the DHHS study. 133

129 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed.
Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 & 164).
130 Id. at 5567.
131 Id.
132
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed.
Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 & 164).
133 Id. at 5676.
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Annual Compliance Costs for Notice of Privacy Practices
Legislation Affected Respondents

Cost of Compliance
(US$/year)

Cost
of
Compliance
Components

HIPAA

$20 million

Drafting privacy notices

$22.4 million

Printing privacy notices

$13.5 million

Mailing privacy notices

698,238 covered entities
(providers, health insurers
and third-party
administrators)

Total Costs

$55.9 million/year

Annual Compliance Costs for Breach Notification
(Total for 698,238 Covered Entities) 134
Cost of Compliance
(US$/year)

Cost of Compliance Components

$3,467,122

E-mail and 1st Class Mail
• Includes the cost to compose and document notice, the hours
and cost to prepare mailing, as well as necessary postage and
supplies

$571,200

Substitute Notices: Media Notice

$1,816,379

Substitute Notices: Toll-free Number
• Includes monthly and direct charges to the line, labor costs, and
costs to individuals

$2,052,665

Imputed cost to affected individuals who call the toll-free line

$15,420

Notice to Media of Breach: Over 500

$15,420

Report to the Secretary: 500 or More

$5,277,456

Investigation Costs: Under 500

$837,500

Investigation Costs: 500 or More

134

Id. at 5671.
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$422,438

Annual Report to the Secretary: Under 500

Total Costs

$14,475,600/year
2.

GLBA Compliance Costs

Robert Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar’s 2002 study detailed the industry-wide cost of
compliance with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). The study found that banking, insurance and
securities companies may, altogether, spend around $2- billion to $5 billion on printing costs alone to
comply with the regulation’s privacy policy notifications. In 2016, nearly 15 years after Hahn and
Farrar’s study in 2002, amendments to the GLBA created exceptions to the annual privacy notice
requirements. 135 In response, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection calculated the decreased
cost of privacy notice procedures yielded from the modifications and found a $3 million reduction in
costs incurred per institution.
Legislation

Estimating
Entity

Affected
Respondents

Cost of
Compliance
Components

Cost of Compliance
(US$/year)

GLBA136

Fred H.
Cate and
FleetBoston
Financial
Corporation

Banking,
insurance and
securities
companies
(surveyed 40,000
financial
institutions)

Printing costs for
all privacy policy
notifications 137

$2-5 billion in the entire
financial industry

1. Drafting policy
2. Consulting
lawyers
3. Hiring part-time
and full-time IT
employees
4. Hiring a Chief
Privacy Officer

Not estimated

Bureau of
Consumer
Financial
Protection

Banks, credit
unions and nondepository
financial
institutions.

Cost of annual
privacy notice

$12 million (preamendment) - $3 million
(savings from amendment)
= $9 million per institution

Amendments
to the
GLBA138

135 Amendment to the Annual Privacy Notice Requirement Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 83 Fed.
Reg. 40945 (Aug. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 1016).
136 Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 Admin. L.
Rev. 85, 145 (2002).
137 Fred H. Cate, The Privacy Paradox (Jan. 26, 2001) (observing that “[a]pproximately 40,000 financial
institutions will be sending as many as 2.5 billion notices to their various customers by June 12, 2001” to comply
with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.)
138 Id., 83 Fed. Reg. 40956 (Aug. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 1016).

24

(surveyed 19
banks with
assets over $100
billion + 106
additional banks
selected through
random
sampling)
3.

 Reduction in burden
(per bank) = $3
million/year.
 Reduction in burden (per
financial
non-depository
institution) = $231,000/year

COPPA Compliance Costs

Compliance with the Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA) appears to be less costly
than those associated with HIPAA or GLBA. In 2000, the House of Representative’s Committee on
Commerce estimated the cost of compliance with COPPA to range from $115,000 to $290,000 per
year for a mid-sized children’s website, depending on the nature of the site. 139 The House Committee
broke down the costs as indicated in the figure below. 140
Breakdown of Estimated Costs in Year 2000 of COPPA Compliance for a Website
Activities
Cost
Legal (audits, construction of private practices and $10,000 - 15,000 (one time)
policy)
Engineering costs to make the site compliant

$35,000 (one time)

Professional chat moderators (price differs
depending on training, hours of operation, and
organization)

$25,000 - $10,000 per month

Personnel overseeing offline consent, responding
to parents’ questions, reviewing phone consents,
and reviewing permission forms

$35,000 - $60,000 per one person per year in
charge of these activities

Personnel overseeing compliance, database
security, responding to verification and access
requests

$35,000 - $60,000 per one person per year in
charge of these activities

Some companies have sought to avoid COPPA altogether by excluding children under age 13
from their consumer base instead of undertaking measures to comply with the legislation.
Recent Developments in Privacy Protections for Consumers, One Hundred Sixth Cong. 83 (2000) (Hearing Before
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Commerce,
House of Representatives).
140 In 2013, definitions of terms such as “personal information” and “operator” were expanded and the
requirements for notice, parental consent, confidentiality, security, and data retention and deletion were updated.
According to an estimate by the Federal Trade Commission, existing businesses could spend more than $6,200
per year to comply with the new rules, while new companies could face up to $18,670 per year. Manatt Phelps &
Phillips LLP, Have Coppa Changes Resulted in Less Content, Higher Costs? (2013),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0b6d68a9-5d17-4d52-9b30-54d356ddb08a.
139
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C.

Compliance in China

We were unable to locate studies on the costs of private sector compliance with China’s data
privacy regime.
In an experiment conducted by Tianshu Sun and his colleagues on Alibaba’s platform in China,
researchers found that when algorithmic recommendations were prohibited by privacy law (because
they often rely on customer profiles), customer engagement and actual marketplace transactions
significantly decreased.141 Though the study focused on a Chinese platform, the findings imply one
type of cost precipitated by privacy laws.
Civil and criminal sanctions, as well as administrative penalties, are available as consequences
for violations of cybersecurity laws. Remedies can include warnings, orders to rectify, fines,
compensation to victims, and even prison sentences. 142 In comparison to the GDPR, which permits
fines of up to 2% of a company’s global annual revenue, an amount that can be in the billions of dollars
for large companies, the fines available under the Chinese law are relatively low—allowing a maximum
fine of approximately RMB 1,000,000 (about $141,000) under the Cybersecurity Law. Authorities may
seek sanctions against responsible personnel, and may also revoke the license to operate, resulting in
the shutdown of an app or website entirely—a remedy even more serious than financial penalties.
Over the last two years, the Chinese authorities have acted against websites and apps that
violated the nation’s data protection laws. Authorities have sought to audit the collection and use of
personal information by mobile apps, evaluating more than 1,000 apps for data practices, and requiring
subsequent changes from many of them. 143 In 2018 and 2019, the Cyberspace Administration of China
conducted an enforcement action against mobile apps to target pornography, gambling, malicious
programs, and other disfavored content, reportedly shutting down approximately 33,638 apps which
were found to possess illicit content. 144
While data protection practices have garnered increased attention, much of the enforcement
related to the digital economy thus far seems targeted at issues of public order. Regulating data
protection practices may be construed as part of a broader effort to ensure control, through audits, of
information circulated online, and thus as part of a national security effort. 145
In 2019, China’s National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee
proposed revisions to the 2018 Specification, calling for companies that either (a) employ more than
200 people to process personal data or (b) process more than 1 million people’s data over the span of
12 months, to appoint a person or office to oversee data protection. 146 Nevertheless, prior to the
implementation of this requirement, the private sector’s costs of compliance with the Cybersecurity
Law were commonly defined by litigation costs. 147 For instance, tech companies such as WeChat,
ByteDance and Tencent have previously sought to seek and prevent access to protected information
by initiating civil disputes against their competitors in court. 148 In the past few years, ordinary citizens
are increasingly taking advantage of this system to fight tech companies in pursuit of their own privacy
rights. 149 Private costs of compliance can also be inferred from the Cybersecurity Law penalty system.
141 Tianshu Sun, Zhe Yuan, Chunxiao Li, Kaifu Zhang, Jun Xu. 2019. The Value of Personal Data in Internet
Commerce: A High-stake Field Experiment on Data Regulation Policy, SSRN Working Paper: Available
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3566758.
142 DLA Piper, supra note 46, at 6.
143 Dai & Deng , supra note 42, at 15.
144 Id. at 16.
145 Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 47 (2010).
146 Gil Zhang & Kate Yin, More Updates on the Chinese Data Protection Regime in 2019 (IAPP 2019).
147 Dai & Deng, supra note 42 at 20.
148 Id. at 3, 20-21.
149 Id. at 21.
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When companies fail to comply with the 2017 Cybersecurity Law, they are subject to 100,000 to
1,000,000 RMB (US$14,351 - $143,517) in fines. 150
While the Cybersecurity Law, like the GDPR and to a certain degree the CCPA, applies to
businesses and organizations in all industries, several sectors in the private sector have additional
requirements regarding data protection and privacy. 151 Within the life sciences industry, China focuses
most of its regulation efforts on localizing health care data and scientific research to protect against
illicit cross-border transfers of data through legislation such as the Measures for the Management of
Scientific Data and the Measures for the Management of Population Health Information. 152 According
to Dentons, health care companies comply with the Cybersecurity Law by categorizing its circulated
data, developing protection policies, and localizing servers storing this information. 153
The People’s Bank of China led regulatory efforts within the financial industry by publishing
the Implementation Measures for Protecting Financial Consumers' Rights and Interests in December
of 2019 and bringing into effect the Personal Financial Information Protection Technical Specification
in February, 2020. 154 The government published the National Standards on Information Security
Technology in March 2020 and they came into force in October 2020. 155 These regulations focus on
protecting consumer financial information and aim to crack down on illegal crawler technology. 156
Companies in the financial industry are advised to construct a sound security system by encrypting data
and ensuring adequate access controls, and are encouraged to justify the purpose, method and scope
of the data collection. 157
The Information Security Technology Personal Information Security Specification governs
the E-Commerce industry, including regulations on how companies may obtain consent from
customers and store their respective data. 158 Online retail stores are advised to require clear and
affirmative consent from customers when collecting personal information, anonymize personal data,
have clearly written contracts with suppliers, and prepare a data breach response plan. 159
III.

Costs of Public Enforcement

How much does it cost to enforce privacy regulations? We examine this question by analyzing
the budgets of the agencies tasked with enforcing data privacy law in Europe, the United States, and
China.
This section aims to identify the financial and employee resources available to the regulators
and compare it with the enforcement actions undertaken by the respective regulators. Both the EU
and the US agencies regularly publish this information on an annual basis. While China has in the last
two years actively enforced data security and privacy rules, we could not locate information on the
budgets for the various Chinese regulators engaged with data privacy enforcement.
China’s data protection regime is the newest of the three major global privacy regimes. Unlike
the GDPR and the US regulations, the Chinese data protection regime does not have a single regulator.
Kpmg China, Wanglu Anquanfa Gailan (网路安全法概览) [An Overview of China’s Cybersecurity
Law] at 6 (2017).
151 Dai & Deng, supra note 42, at 23.
152 Id. at 24-25.
153 Id. at 25.
154 Bird & Bird, supra note 34.
155 Id.
156 Dai & Deng, supra note 42, at 26.
157 Id. at 27.
158 Id. at 28-29.
159 Id. at 29.
150
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Instead, the Cyberspace Administration of China seems to be the primary regulator, and agencies like
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State
Administration for Market Regulation, and the Ministry of Science and Technology are also vested
with significant regulatory and enforcement roles. Budgets for data protection enforcement were not
readily available, so we limit our discussion to describing enforcement activities.
This is a fast-changing area, and any snapshot will not capture the full dynamics at play. While
the GDPR builds upon an earlier privacy regime, all of the privacy regimes in these three jurisdictions
have undergone dramatic changes in the last two years. Indeed, the CCPA just went into effect this
year, and has yet to see its first enforcement action. What this review makes clear is that budgets for
enforcement have not kept up with either the regulations or the scope of the digital economy.
A.

Enforcement in the EU

1.

Overview

2.

National Enforcement

On average, the then-28 European Union member states allocated €12.1 million to each of
their data protection authorities in 2020. 160 At the high end, Germany allocated €85.7 million among
both its federal and state data protection authorities, while Cyprus, Malta, and Estonia, allocated just
€0.5 million, €0.6 million, and €0.8 million for the latest year available. 161
The GDPR requires each EU Member States to establish Data Protection Authorities (DPA)
with sufficient financial resources for their operation. 162 The DPAs enforce the GDPR, and also raise
awareness, provide guidance, handle complaints, and conduct investigations. The GDPR also imposes
a duty of cooperation on Member States. 163 The GDPR hoped to create a one-stop shop enforcement
mechanism, charging the supervisory authority of the “main establishment” of the controller or
processor as the “lead supervisory authority” for the cross-border processing activities of that
controller or processor. 164 Secondary “concerned authorities” may also assist in the investigation. 165
Budgets allocated to DPAs are generally increasing, although at significantly lower rates than
the one time jump observed between 2017 and 2018, the latter being the year when the GDPR went
into effect. 166 Twenty-one of the 30 DPAs surveyed by the European Data Protection Board
(EDPB) 167 reported dissatisfaction with their level of resourcing. 168 This dissatisfaction stems from a
combination of the following: (1) significant increases in data privacy complaints, especially those that
implicate big tech firms or carry cross-border components, (2) the complex system in which crossborder complaints are handled; and (3) insufficient resources to match complaint growth.
Most European governments spend less than a euro per citizen per year on their data
protection authority. Many supervisory authorities complain of insufficient funding. Despite such
This excludes Cyprus, for which the 2020 budget allocation was not reported.
Johnny Ryan & Alan Toner, Europe’s Governments are failing the GDPR, 2020 (vacancies included in count
and full-time equivalents are rounded; data on Austria’s tech specialists unavailable).
162 Council Directive 2016/679, art. 52, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2.
163 Id. art. 31.
164 GDPR, art. 56.
165 Id. art. 4(22).
166 Ryan & Toner, supra note 161.
167 Under the GDPR, the European Data Protection Board is the working group constituted by
representatives of each of the national data protection authorities of all the EU member states.
168 European Data Protection Board, Individual replies from the data protection supervisory authorities, 2020.
https://edpb.europa.eu/individual-replies-data-protection-supervisory-authorities_en.
160
161
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complaints, most DPAs expect budgets to remain static in the upcoming year. 169 In response to these
trends, the European Parliament has called for infringement proceedings against Member States
accused of breaching Article 52 of the GDPR by failing to provide a budget that fosters effective
performance. 170

2020 DPA Budgets in Millions of Euro
United Kingdom
Germany (Länder)
Italy
Germany (Federal)
France
Netherlands
Ireland
Spain
Sweden
Poland
Belgium
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Denmark
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Data subjects and related organizations submit complaints, and data processors and
controllers submit data breach notifications, to the Data Protection Authorities through online forms
and supplementary guided procedures. Cases with cross-border components can be received through
a DPA’s website or through the Internal Market Information System (IMI), which operates as a
communication tool for all EU Member States. Through IMI, DPAs can cooperate with the authorities
of other concerned or lead Member States by utilizing a series of pre-translated question and answer

Estelle Massé, Two Years Under the EU GDPR, Access Now (2020).
Id. at 12.
171 European Data Protection Board, Individual replies from the data protection supervisory authorities (2020). Slightly
different budget figures are reported in Deloitte, Report on EU Data Protection Authorities Part 4: Resources, 2019.
169
170
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forms, while also tracking the case’s development. 172 Complaints may also be lodged by the DPA itself
pursuant to the investigative and supervisory powers granted by the GDPR.
The second year of GDPR implementation has seen a dramatic increase in the quantity of
complaints received by Member States. Since May 25, 2018, the United Kingdom alone has received
64,667 complaints and the German authorities 66,965. 173 Each complaint requires processing by DPA
employees, and if appropriate, an investigation to determine the complaint’s validity. As awareness of
data protection rights increases through media reports and DPA sponsored podcasts and social media
accounts, several Member States have turned to helpdesk services and online live chats in an effort to
respond to the influx of complaints received by overworked complaint handlers. 174 These approaches
seek to offer early-stage assessments of data privacy queries by answering questions and suggesting
when potential complaints should be lodged. 175
In 2019, Ireland’s Department of Information and Assessment received 48,500 contacts
related to data privacy: 22,300 emails, 22,200 phone calls, and 4,000 letters through post. 176 Ireland
relies on the early-stage assessment tool as their DPA reportedly receives 150 new complaints every
week – with a growing number of data subjects finding “novel ways” to apply the GDPR, according
to Data Protection Commissioner Helen Dixon. 177

EUROPEAN COMM'N, SINGLE MARKET SCOREBOARD 2019 (European Comm'n 2019).
Id., Individual replies from the data protection supervisory authorities (2020).
174 Info. Commissioner’s Office, GDPR: One Year On (Info. Commissioner’s Office 2019).
175 The Commissioner for Data Protection, Annual Report (Data Prot. Comm'n 2020).
176 Id. at 17.
177 Simon Carswell, Big Tech ‘procedural Queries’ Delay Decision on First Data Fines – Watchdog, 2020 THE IRISH
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2020 at (2020), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/big-tech-procedural-queriesdelay-decision-on-first-data-fines-watchdog-1.4178751.
172
173
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Data Privacy Complaints and Data Breach Notifications Received v. Fines Imposed in
EU
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✤ data concluded on October 31, 2019, ✢ data concluded on November 30, 2019, ⌯ data concluded on December
31, 2019.
Despite the large volume of complaints submitted, the number of fines issued in the first two
years of the GDPR’s operation has remained low. By February 13, 2021, EU nations (including the
UK) had issued 514 fines under the GDPR, totaling € 275,860,338. 179 Spain takes the quantitative lead,
having imposed 91 fines to date since the GDPR’s inception, though the Spanish DPA received 18,480
complaints and 1,434 reports of data breaches since May 25, 2018. 180 The United Kingdom and
Germany — while having the largest DPAs in terms of both budget and staff compared to other
Member States — have imposed just 4 and 28 fines, respectively, at the time of this writing. 181

European Data Protection Board, Individual replies from the data protection supervisory authorities (2020); CMS
Law, GDPR Enforcement Tracker (2020), https://www.enforcementtracker.com.
179 CMS Law, GDPR Enforcement Tracker, 2021, https://www.enforcementtracker.com/?insights.
180 CMS Law, GDPR Enforcement Tracker, 2021, https://www.enforcementtracker.com
181 Id.
178
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Number of Fines Imposed

Number of Complaints and Data Breaches Received

80,000

Numerous supervisory authorities have attributed the disparity between the number of complaints
received and fines issued to a lack of resources. 182
Supervisory authorities have reported that the cooperation mechanism in which cross-border
cases are compelled to operate creates significantly longer investigations and decision-making
proceedings. Compulsory measures such as the exchange of relevant information and case
development notifications often proceed at a slow pace. 183 Although IMI provides pre-translated
forms for early stages of the complaint process, the system cannot translate documents and other
correspondence relevant to the investigation and decision-making proceedings, sometimes requiring
expenditures on independent translation services. The supervisory authorities of Bulgaria and Germany
have noted that these translations have a considerable effect on the duration and cost of investigations,
especially when cases require multiple liaises across Europe. 184
The novel and complex legal issues presented during GDPR investigations and proceedings
require substantial expenditures on legal counsel. When overseeing cross-border cases, the DPA must
take into account the national procedural rules of the Member States of which an affected data subject
is a citizen. 185 Italy’s DPA reported that the additional legal research and dialogue required between
Member States during cross-border proceedings has caused lengthened proceedings and delayed
sanctions. 186 Germany, with a reported budget of €76,599,800 (more than double that of Italy’s), has
voiced similar complaints as their DPAs face a backlog totaling 1,200 cases, some extending as far back
as 2017. 187
Individual cases can prove extremely costly for regulators. A single investigation into
Cambridge Analytica carried out by the UK data protection authority cost 2.4 million pounds (about
$3.1 million) and took more than three years. 188 The investigation required it to review 42 laptops and
computers, 700 TB of data, 31 servers, over 300,000 documents; and a wide range of material in paper
form and from cloud storage devices. 189 After the Austrian activist Max Schrems successfully obtained
a Court of Justice of the European Union decision 190 concerning cross-border data transfers to the
United States, Ireland was ordered to pay his legal costs – a bill estimated to exceed €2 million euros. 191
On average, each of the eleven lawyers in the Austrian data protection authority manages over
100 cases, cross-border and national, simultaneously. 192 With many DPA budgets failing to provide the
legal resources necessary to efficiently resolve cross-border complaints, Member States like Malta have
expressed the need to prioritize national complaints and limit their role in matters of regional
concern. 193
Id., Individual replies from the data protection supervisory authorities (2020), available at
https://edpb.europa.eu/individual-replies-data-protection-supervisory-authorities_en.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 European Data Protection Board, Annual Report 2019 (2020).
186 Id. Individual replies from the data protection supervisory authorities (2020).
187 Hamburg, Tatigkeitsbericht Datenschutz 2019 (2020).
188
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/10/06/1602008755000/ICO-s-final-report-into-CambridgeAnalytica-invites-regulatory-questions/
189
https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/06/cambridge-analytica-sought-to-use-facebook-data-to-predictpartisanship-for-voter-targeting-uk-investigation-confirms/.
190 Case C-311/18 - Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems
(adopted on 23 July 2020).
191 Cianan Brennan, Data Protection Commission hit with massive legal bill after Facebook privacy case.,
Irish Examiner, Oct. 30, 2020, https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-40073378.html.
192 Austrian Supervisory Authority, Evaluation of the GDPR under Article 97 – Questions to Data Protection
Authorities/European Data Protection Supervisory Board 6 (2020), available at https://edpb.europa.eu/individualreplies-data-protection-supervisory-authorities_en.
193 Id.
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Procedural queries by the legal teams of investigated data controllers further delay the
decision-making process. 194 The DPAs oversee the regulation of data processors with revenues that
are orders of magnitude larger than their budget. A notable example is Luxembourg, which allocates
€5 million for data protection enforcement, including enforcing data protection against companies
such as Amazon. 195
The GDPR also creates a private right of action for material or non-material damage suffered
from a breach of data privacy laws. Pursuant to Article 78, a data subject may seek a judicial remedy
before the courts of the supervisory authority’s Member State. A data subject can also file suit against
competent supervisory authorities that (1) fail to conduct an investigation where a valid complaint
exists or (2) fail to notify data subjects of developments related to the case within three months of
processing. 196 Data subjects may seek recourse independently or through representation via an
organization, so long as that organization’s statutory objectives are aligned with the public interest and
demonstrate an active presence in data rights. 197 Although at present, no data subjects or organizations
have invoked Article 78 against a supervisory authority, the pressure additional legal proceedings would
place on an already strained legal staff with a small budget is a matter of growing concern. 198
DPA Staff in Europe 2019: Total Staff v. Tech Specialists
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According to one report, only six DPAs have more than ten technology specialists on staff
contributing to investigations, while half of Europe’s DPAs employ five or fewer technology
Massé, supra note 165.
Id. at 11.
196 Council Directive 2016/679, art. 77, 78(2), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2.
197 Id. art. 80(1).
198 Ryan & Toner, supra note 158.
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United Kingdom
Poland
France
Spain
Netherlands
Italy
Ireland
Hungary
Czech Republic
Denmark
Bulgaria
Belgium
Slovakia
Slovenia
Finland
Croatia
Greece
Austria
Luxembourg
Lithuania
Portugal
Cyprus
Latvia
Estonia
Romania
Malta

Total Number of Full-Time Employed Staff

900

specialists. 200 Supervisory authorities like Belgium and the Czech Republic have reported that a
shortage in tech investigators has limited their investigative abilities, making the collection and
conservation of digital proof related to GDPR violations difficult. 201 Germany, although accounting
for 29% of Europe’s technology specialists, has received similar complaints from state-level DPAs. 202
The recruitment and retainment of tech specialists has also proven challenging as DPAs with restrictive
budgets, 14 of which have annual budgets under €5 million, are unable to attract qualified technology
experts due to uncompetitive wages. 203
The United Kingdom’s ICO has undertaken efforts to mitigate the risk of uncompetitive pay
by reviewing pay arrangements against the private sector and establishing apprenticeships to attract
budding specialists. 204 DPAs like Bulgaria, which lack the opportunity to undertake such reviews and
programs due to limited budgets, have reported a decrease in staff as qualified employees abandon
their roles due to wage dissatisfaction. 205
B.
Enforcement in the US
The United States does not have a single data privacy authority. Rather, various federal privacy
laws are enforced by different agencies. In the health sector, the HIPAA is enforced principally by the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the DHHS. In the financial sector, the GLBA is enforced by a number
of banking regulators as well as the FTC. Each of these regulators is funded separately by the US
federal government. The FTC serves also as a sort of de facto privacy regulator under the rubric of
regulating unfair and deceptive practices.
The following sections provide an overview of the U.S. data protection regulations at federal
and state levels. They focus on the enforcement of two major privacy laws – the HIPAA and GLBA.
Then, we turn to examine the cost of enforcement by the regulatory agencies.
1.

HIPAA Enforcement Costs

The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the DHHS enforces the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and
Breach Notification Rules. 206 The Office for Civil Rights also promotes broad awareness of HIPAA
rights and protections. 207 It issues regulations and guidance, exacts civil monetary penalties, and
pursues investigations and settlement agreements. 208 OCR funds its HIPAA enforcement efforts
through both the civil monetary settlement funds it collects, as well as discretionary budget
allocations. 209
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HIPAA Enforcement Budget and Personnel (Dollars in Millions) 210
Fiscal Year

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Discretionary
Budget
Authority

39

39

39

39

30

Civil Monetary
Settlement
Funds

24

20

8

13

23

Total

63

59

47

52

53

Number of
Employees
(Full-Time
Equivalents)

170

179

138

155

159

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, The President’s Fiscal Year 2020 Budget 147, 147-48 (2020);
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, The President’s Fiscal Year 2019 Budget 125 (2020); U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Services, The President’s Fiscal Year 2019 Budget 2018 Budget 95, 95-96 (2018).
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From 2016 to 2019, the OCR’s use of the Discretionary Budget remained consistent at $39 million but
decreased to $30 million in 2020. The shortfall was more than made up by increased amounts available
for enforcement from the Civil Monetary Settlement Fund, which were $8 million, $13 million, and
$23 million in 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively. The number of employees, however, has decreased
in recent years.
2.

FTC and Privacy and Data Security Enforcement

In addition to the broad power it holds under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC
also enforces a variety of other statutes, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Truth in Lending
Act, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act, the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act. 211 The FTC’s enforcement thus addresses a wide range of privacy issues across a
variety of industries, including social media, advertising technology, the mobile app ecosystem, and
even the internet of things. 212
While the FTC’s overall enacted budget in fiscal year 2019 was $309.7 million, with 1,140 fulltime employees, its budget and staff for privacy enforcement represents a small share of these larger
totals. Despite an increase in workload, the FTC’s budget for privacy enforcement has remained
remarkably stagnant, until 2020, a year in which it also undertook a record number of enforcement
actions. The FTC’s privacy enforcement budget for 2021 has also been raised to a total of $13
million. 213
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FTC Spending and Workforce Dedicated to Privacy Enforcement (Dollars in Millions) 214
Fiscal Year

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Privacy and
Identity
Protection

10

10

9.9

9.8

12.6

Number of
Employees (FullTime Equivalents)

57

54

52

52

61

3.

California Consumer Privacy Act

The California Department of Justice enforces privacy laws through both its Consumer Law
Unit and Privacy Unit. 215 Even prior to the passage of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA),
California had enforced various data protection laws including the Data Breach Notification Statute. 216
214 U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Budget Justification 131 (2016); U.S. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Fiscal year 2018 Congressional Budget Justification 141 (2017); U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Congressional Budget Justification 121 (2020).
215 Privacy and Data Security Law Blog (July 26, 2012), https://www.winston.com/en/privacy-lawcorner/california-attorney-general-creates-privacy-enforcement-and-protection-unit.html.
216 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.25 – 1798.78 (West 1977) (requiring a business a business or a government
agency that owns or licenses unencrypted computerized data that includes personal information, as defined, to
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With the coming of the CCPA, The California Department of Justice has requested an additional 23
full-time employees at an estimated cost of approximately $4.5 million per year. 217
C.

Enforcement in China

Multiple agencies are charged with enforcing Chinese privacy and cybersecurity law. While
China does not have any single “supervisory authority dedicated to the protection of personal
information,” 218 the Cyberspace Administration of China is generally considered the primary data
protection authority in China. 219 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (“MIIT”), the
Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”) and the State Administration for Market Regulation (“SAMR”)
also have significant regulatory and enforcement roles with respect to data protection. Enforcement
can also occur at the provincial level. In addition, sectoral regulators, such as the People’s Bank of
China or the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, “may also monitor and enforce
data protection issues of regulated institutions within their sector.” 220
The Chinese government has in recent years launched campaigns against the misuse of
information by mobile apps. 221 While the Cyberspace Administration of China’s campaign focused
more on shutting down apps, websites and accounts that circulated pornography and “malicious
programs,” MIIT, MPS and SAMR worked to address the infringement of users’ rights and the illicit
collecting of personal information. The following table outlines the work of their campaigns. 222
Ministry of Industry
and Information
Technology
(# of apps/websites)
Requested over 100
companies to rectify their
policies on the collection
and use of personal data.

Ministry of Public Security
(# of apps/websites)

State Administration for Market
Regulation (# of apps/websites)

Requested 27 companies to Investigated 1,474 cases of consumer
rectify. Issued warnings information infringement. Fined
against 63 companies. Fined more than 19.64 million yuan.
10 companies. Commenced
criminal investigations on 2
companies.

While there is no overall estimate of China’s public sector costs in enforcing the Cybersecurity Law
and its regulations, many major cities and prefectures within China have established their own branch
of the Cyberspace Administration of China. The remit of these offices extends beyond data privacy.
The following table illustrates the expenditures of a few of these offices for the 2020 fiscal year.
notify any California resident whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have
been, acquired by an unauthorized person).
217 Id.
218 Pernot-Leplay, supra note 3, at 86.
219 DLA Piper, supra note 46, at 3 (2020).
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221 Id. at 15.
222 Id. at 16-17.
38

IV.

City or Province

Total Budget
(USD/year) (millions)

Population

Hubei Province

$5.5

58,500,000

Yunan Province

$3

48,300,000

Siping City

$0.2

594,000

Chuxiong Yi Prefecture

$0.4

2,684,000

Shanghai City

$2.7

24,280,000

Suzhou City

$1.1

10,720,000

Lessons for Data Privacy in Developing Countries

As the above review demonstrates, the cost of data privacy compliance can be quite high, so
high that companies avoid certain jurisdictions entirely or simply ignore the laws. The GDPR can be
so difficult to comply with that more than half of the EU privacy professionals surveyed in the
IAPP/EY study said that their organizations were not “fully” or even “very” compliant. 223 At the same
time, the cost of not having data privacy protection can be quite high as well, and results in consumers
and other counterparties avoiding beneficial transactions because of the risks that the information they
share will be misused. Concerns over costs of compliance or costs of enforcement might be
ameliorated if stronger data protection laws make it easier for local businesses to participate in global
value chains. 224 The digital economy depends on a proper legal framework that protects privacy. Based
on the studies above and our discussions with experts, we offer a few recommendations below, with
the particular needs of developing countries in mind.
Ensure clear rules. Rules that make clear what companies need to do both reduce costs and
increase compliance. A common complaint about both EU and Chinese data privacy law among
experts we spoke with was that it can be difficult to know how to comply with the law. The GDPR’s
complex framework (there are 173 recitals and 99 articles, and multiple guidance documents) generally
requires expensive legal counsel to navigate. 225 One interviewee noted that a hospital participating in a
clinical research trial with a drug company might be classified as a processor, a joint controller, or a
controller in its own right, depending on the which government is enforcing the rules. A recent case
from the Court of Justice of the European Union will require companies to hire lawyers to give
opinions on foreign intelligence laws of every country to which the companies are transferring
information outside the European Union, including the few states that have received a positive
adequacy decision. 226 For their part, the Chinese rules may be highly detailed, but that detail often exists
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in the form of draft rules or guidelines, rather than clearly binding law. This makes it difficult to
distinguish obligations from suggestions for best practices.
Recognize the cost of data localization. Data localization is a particularly expensive and burdensome
mandate. Businesses increasingly depend on cloud service providers rather than hosting their own
servers or managing their own cybersecurity. Data localization imposes additional costs on local
MSMEs, by requiring them to utilize local cloud services that are often more expensive than ones
available globally. It can also harm domestic consumers and businesses by reducing the availability of
foreign services, if those services decide that they do not wish to undertake either the expense or the
additional security risks of building or renting a local data infrastructure. If the goal is to promote
privacy and security, governments should insist on both as the data travels abroad.
Strive for interoperability. Multiple sets of laws greatly magnify both the complexity and expense
of privacy regulation. A company that complies with the GDPR must still hire lawyers to comply with
the local privacy laws of all the jurisdictions in which it operates, despite having extensive privacy
protections in place already. Requiring a company operating in multiple jurisdictions to follow similar,
but yet different laws, raises compliance costs with little if any practical increase in privacy protections.
However, laws can be written to recognize compliance with foreign laws as one method of complying
with local law, thereby allowing companies to reduce such costs and burdens. For example, a national
privacy law could declare that a company that complies with the GDPR, the EU-US Privacy Shield, or
the CCPA is automatically in compliance with that national privacy law. This would help draw global
companies to offer services in that jurisdiction.
Consider burdens on small enterprises. Regulatory complexity poses a special challenge for micro,
small, and medium-sized enterprises that do not have the resources to hire lawyers to create tailored
privacy programs. It may be difficult for those working in the informal sector, for example, to comply
with formal requirements such as notice. (Even an informal laborer may keep on his or her phone
personal information about others, whether a friend or a business counterparty.) One response to this
problem is to provide exceptions for smaller enterprises from certain requirements. For example, the
California Consumer Privacy Act only covers businesses that have $25 million or more in annual
revenue or that traffic in the personal information of at least 50,000 Californians. One approach is to
use ex post facto liability to discipline abuses of data.
Establish a model that is conducive to cross-border data transfers. Many countries have modeled their
laws on the GDPR, often in the hope of obtaining a favorable adequacy decision from the European
Commission. This is understandable because any such adequacy decision would enhance opportunities
to receive personal information about EU residents, making it easier to supply services to the large EU
market. However, in the quarter-century following the European Data Protection Directive, only two
developing countries, Argentina (in 2003) and Uruguay (in 2012), have received a favorable adequacy
decision from the European Union. 227 Furthermore, the standard for receiving a favorable adequacy
decision only appears to have become stricter over time. Japan was recently recognized with an
227 Robert Carolina, Why the EU Has Issued Relatively Few Data Protection Adequacy Determinations? A Reply,
LAWFARE (Jan. 13, 2017), (observing that Uruguay sought the status because it hoped to “attract business from
Europe … that includes a large personal data processing component such as call centers, financial services, and
telemedicine.”).
https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-eu-has-issued-relatively-few-data-protection-adequacydeterminations-reply (observing that Uruguay sought the status because it hoped to “attract business from
Europe … that includes a large personal data processing component such as call centers, financial services, and
telemedicine.”).
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adequacy decision, but only after “80 rounds of negotiations played out over 300 hours” taking place
between April 2016 and January 2019. 228 Only one country is currently being considered for an
adequacy decision—the Republic of Korea. 229 An adequacy decision is not the exclusive means to
transfer personal data outside the European Union. The GDPR permits a variety of mechanisms for
cross-border transfer of personal data, from Standard Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate
Rules to newer possibilities for certifications and codes of conduct.230 These mechanisms are likely to
prove more realistic possibilities for developing countries than the hope for a favorable adequacy
decision.
One possible alternative model might lie in the EU-US Privacy Shield, which was carefully
negotiated between the United States and the European Commission to protect the privacy of
European Union residents when their information is transferred to the United States. The Privacy
Shield represents a kind of streamlined GDPR. Companies that certified that they would comply with
the extensive set of rules set forth in the Privacy Shield were allowed to receive that data. Some 5,300
companies signed up, certifying compliance. On July 16, 2020, the Court of Justice of the European
Union struck down the EU-US Privacy Shield on the ground that it did not provide sufficient legal
rights to European residents to challenge U.S. foreign surveillance. 231 If that issue can be resolved
(through, for example, extending legal rights to challenge surveillance to foreigners), the Privacy Shield
might serve as a useful model for other nations to permit interoperability. Experts we spoke with
affirmed that companies took compliance with the Privacy Shield seriously. While the Privacy Shield
was designed to facilitate cross-border transfer of data from the European Union to the United
States, 232 it represents a workable attempt to meet core European Union concerns with data privacy in
a way that companies seem to manage. Its principles thus could well serve as a model for national
privacy laws themselves. Companies seeking to comply with the Privacy Shield must (1) publish a
privacy policy with certain specified information; (2) provide option to opt-out (opt-in for sensitive
data) for disclosures to third parties or for uses for a materially different purpose than that for which
the data was provided; (3) enter into contracts to protect data when sharing data with third parties or
agents; (4) take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect security of data; (5) limit processing to
authorized purposes; (6) provide rights to access, correct, amend, or delete; and (7) provide recourse
for complaints. 233 In addition, companies must abide by 16 supplementary principles.
***
Getting data privacy law right is critical for every country in the twenty-first century. Our study
shows that even the United States and the EU do not expend sums far outside the reach of many
developing nations to enforce data privacy law. Indeed, the smallest European nations spend only halfa-million dollars annually for their data privacy authority. Furthermore, while costs of compliance for
private businesses vary significantly, developing states could take steps such as relaxed mandates for
small and medium-sized businesses, or ex post facto liability rules for negligent or intentional abuses
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of personal data. Developing states might also engage regionally and bilaterally with other jurisdictions
to effectively distribute the costs of enforcement through systems of mutual recognition.
As the above review demonstrates, the cost of data privacy compliance can be quite high, so
high that companies avoid certain jurisdictions entirely or simply ignore the laws. The GDPR can be
so difficult to comply with that more than half of the EU privacy professionals surveyed in the
IAPP/EY study said that their organizations were not “fully” or even “very” compliant. 234 At the same
time, the cost of not having data privacy protection can be quite high as well, and results in consumers
and other counterparties avoiding beneficial transactions because of the risks that the information they
share will be misused. Concerns over costs of compliance or costs of enforcement might be
ameliorated if stronger data protection laws make it easier for local businesses to participate in global
value chains. 235 The digital economy depends on a proper legal framework that protects privacy.
The study also reveals the need for further inquiry. Private companies are reluctant to publish
information about the costs of compliance, which might be perceived as either too little (by consumers)
or too much (by shareholders). Might particular data privacy obligations such as the right to data access,
to redress, to reasonable cybersecurity, for example, offer particularly cost-effective privacy?
Governments should review their own enforcement efforts, including whether the resources they
deploy are sufficient to regulate the growing digital economy. How effective are different types of
government enforcement efforts (such as audits, sanctions, or guidance regarding best practices)?
Governments could gather more data from companies on their compliance expenditures.
Understanding costs is a critical step towards achieving privacy.
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